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Abstract. In this paper we present an approach for specifying and pri-
oritizing information security requirements in organizations. It is impor-
tant to prioritize security requirements since hundred per cent security is
not achievable and the limited resources available should be directed to
satisfy the most important ones. We propose to link explicitly security
requirements with the organization’s business vision, i.e. to provide busi-
ness rationale for security requirements. The rationale is then used as a
basis for comparing the importance of different security requirements.
A conceptual framework is presented, where the relationships between
business vision, critical impact factors and valuable assets (together with
their security requirements) are shown.
1 Introduction
The increasing concerns of clients, particularly in online commerce, plus the im-
pact of legislations on information security have compelled companies to put
more resources in information security. It is clear that senior managers in many
organizations are now expressing a much greater interest in information secu-
rity. Understanding and specifying what kind of security an organization need
is however a difficult task. Many underlying goals (why and what security is
needed) remain tacit within organizations and requirements end up being ar-
ticulated as specifications of the security control baseline (how security will be
achieved) without a clear rationale. The problem becomes more urgent when
more and more organizations are involved in collaboration and commerce. Be-
ing able to articulate security goals and requirements consistently, based on an
accurate view of existing security capabilities, and using shared understandings,
becomes much more important. Networked business will be difficult to function
if the organizations involved cannot agree: why security is necessary; the scope
it should cover and what each organization expects it to achieve.
The complexity of undertaking an enterprise-wide view of security manage-
ment can be illustrated in the challenges facing chief security officers (CSO).
Often CSOs are tasked with ”securing” the organization, but it may not be
clear what that means. As a result, the CSO is often left to answer very impor-
tant organization questions without specific guidance: What needs to be secured?
Why, and in what priority? How to ensure that people agree on the above issue?
How will I know when the organization has been ”secured”? What will be used
to measure success?
We believe that to answer the above questions, it is necessary to link the
security requirements with the organization’s unique business drivers. E.g., for
a production company, the availability of its production control system is of
vital importance, whereas for a financial service provider, it is important to pro-
tect the integrity of its financial transactions. The reason of making explicit the
business rationale behind security requirement is twofold. Firstly, different orga-
nizations have different business drivers, which in turn determine their different
requirements to security. Secondly, since hundred per cent security is not achiev-
able and the limited resources available should be directed to satisfy the most
important ones, we need a way to prioritize security requirements. The business
rationale serves as the underlining criterion for evaluating how important each
security requirement is. It is our intention in this paper to develop techniques
and instruments to help stakeholders articulate the connection between security
requirements and the business drivers in a systematic way. Further, we shall use
the rationale to prioritize security requirements.
2 Formulating and Understanding Security Goals and
Requirements
A security requirement specification tells what should be secured and why. It
identifies the organizations’ needs with respect to security. Consider, for exam-
ple, the differences between the needs of a university and that of a cryptographic
organization. The university fosters scholarship and open research: papers, dis-
coveries, and work are available to the general public as well as to other aca-
demics. The cryptographic organization, on the other hand, prizes secrecy. The
university will need to protect the integrity and confidentiality of the data, such
as grades, on its systems. It might also want to ensure that the system is avail-
able via the Internet so that students, faculty, and other researchers have access
to information. The cryptographic organization, though, will emphasize confi-
dentiality of all its work.
When an organization wants to secure its system, it must first determine what
requirements to meet. Given that organizations normally have limited resources
to protect its assets, it is equally important to determine which requirements
are more important and thus should be prioritized. To achieve this, we propose
to use a conceptual framework where security requirements are linked to the
unique business drivers of the organization in question. Figure 1 portrays the
conceptual framework. The business vision consists of high level business goals
the organization has. Critical Impact Factors (CIFs) identify what will be the
business impacts if security requirements are violated. Valuable assets and their
security requirements are inventories of security requirements. Valuable assets
and their security requirements have an effect on the CIFs and the CIFs in turn
impact the accomplishment of the organization’s business vision. In other words,
we can use an organization’s business vision to prioritize the CIFs, which can
be used to further prioritize the security requirements. To achieve that, three
subsequent steps need to be taken. Firstly an organization’s CIFs and business
vision need to be defined. Secondly, we need to enumerate valuable assets and
their security requirements. Thirdly, security requirements shall be linked with
CIFs and business vision. We will discuss them in detail.
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Fig. 1. Linking security requirements with business vision via CIF.
2.1 The business vision
Each organization has its own unique business vision that defines the very prin-
ciples of how the business wants to achieve its goals. This vision, moreover,
often changes over time to reflect changing circumstances. Notwithstanding this
diversity, scholars in business administration have identified certain “patterns”
in the business vision of leading firms. In this paper, we use the well-known
value disciplines identified by Treacy and Wiersema [1, 2] as a framework for
understanding the business vision.
Treacy and Wiersema argue that there are three generic ways a business can
differentiate itself from the competition, which they call operational excellence,
customer intimacy, and product leadership. Each of these three value disciplines
aims at creating distinguishing value for customers, but each does so in a dif-
ferent way. A company striving for operational excellence focuses on offering its
products with the least amount of hassle possible (usually, at the lowest cost)
to its customers. A customer intimacy company aims at delivering exactly what
its customers want by investigating the needs of a narrow market and then cus-
tomizing its offerings to this market. Finally, a product leader aims at delivering
radically innovative products that create an unbridgeable gap with the compe-
tition.
Each of the three value disciplines leads to a radically different operating
model for the company: the culture, processes, management systems and IT
systems of the company. For instance, while operational excellence calls for highly
standardized business processes, the customer intimacy discipline requires just
the opposite: to meet customer requirements, business processes should be as
flexible as possible. Security requirements should be likewise aligned with the
requirements imposed upon culture, processes and management systems by the
value discipline chosen.
2.2 Identifying the critical impact factors
When security incidents happen, they may lead to damage to organizations.
Critical impact factors are the indicators of what kind of damage the security
incidents incur to the organization. They can include those within the control of
the organization (e.g. loss of productivity), as well as that the organization may
not be able to fully control (e.g., legal liability, and reputational damage). We
do not provide any explicit guidance for developing organization’s CIFs in this
paper. However, experienced executives and security officers generally identify
some CIFs because they are part of their management domain. Other sources
for identifying CIFs could include industry specific CIFs or reviews of peer CIFs
if available. Figure 2 illustrate an example list of critical impact factors.
CIF
financial loss reputation damage
loss of 
productivity legal liability
Fig. 2. An example of Critical Impact Factors.
2.3 Selecting valuable assets and security requirements
The business vision can be used to guide the selection of valuable assets. Surely,
the assets that are critical for accomplishing the business vision are the valuable
ones for the organizations. For example, a financial service company that fo-
cuses on customer intimacy will consider its customer relationship management
(CRM) systems as extremely valuable, while a financial service company that
focuses at product leadership will likely value its systems for developing new
financial products even higher.
Information security is about defining encompassing systems and procedures
designed to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability3 of an organi-
zation’s critical information and technical assets [3]. Information assets are the
data and information, in either physical or electronic from, that is critical to the
organization. Technical assets are those assets that support the storage, trans-
mission, and processing of data and information and therefore are important to
transforming data and information to be used by the organization. People can
3 Some authorities treat communication security issues such as non-repudiation and
privacy-related issues such as anonymity as additional aspects of security.
be an asset to the organization as well for similar reason – they can be a primary
way of storing, transporting, or processing data.
So, IT security is about safeguard certain desired properties. The core of
computer and information security is widely regarded as the preservation of three
factors: confidentiality (ensuring that information is accessible only to those
authorized to access), integrity (safeguarding the accuracy and completeness
of information and processing methods) and availability (ensuring that only
authorized users have access to information and associated assets when required)
[4]. Figure 3 depicts a simple ontology of asset and the security properties that
are in the scope. Such an ontology can be used as a starting point to structure
assets and their security properties. It is a minimum set and can be extended. For
instance, some will include privacy issues like anonymity as a security property
too4. Using such an ontology, the assets and their security properties can be
structured accordingly.
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Fig. 3. A simple ontology of asset and security property.
2.4 Prioritizing security requirements
To further elaborate the relations between security requirements and the busi-
ness vision, the connection between them can be established via the linkage of
CIFs. Figure 4 provides an example of such linkage for a production company. In
this example, the organization is stating that any compromise to ”availability”
of the ”control system” has ”critical impact” to ”loss of productivity”, which in
turn has ”critical impact” to the organization’s vision ”improve operational effi-
ciency”. The impact severity can be categorized according to the organization’s
needs. An example categorization can be critical impact, marginal impact, and
negligible impact. In this way, each security requirements can be connected to its
CIFs and the CIFs further to business vision.
Using the impact diagram like figure 4, it is possible to categorize and pri-
oritize the different security requirements. Requirements that have ”critical im-
pact” on CIFs, that in turn have ”critical impact” on business vision, should be
4 Firesmith provides a list of security properties in his work [5].
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Fig. 4. An example of linking asset security requirement with business vision via CIFs.
considered of most importance. These requirements shall be satisfied first if the
resources (time, money, manpower etc.) are limited. In this example, it means
that, for the production company, it is more important to mitigate threats to
the control system’s availability than for instance, threats to the control system’s
confidentiality. It is possible that one requirement may be linked to more than
one CIFs. When that happens the overall significance of that security require-
ment can be determined in a number of ways. For example, one can choose the
maximum impact level, e.g. if control system’s availability not only has ”critical
impact” on loss of productivity but also has ”marginal impact” on reputation
damage, the overall impact should be ”critical impact”. Alternatively, one can
choose the average impact level. The organization shall decide which combina-
tion methods best reflects its situation.
The reason why we use CIFs to link critical assets and their security re-
quirements with business vision is twofold. The business vision typically resides
at the strategic level. When the business vision is outlined, the stakeholders
do not normally have a security focus in mind. The Critical Impact Factors on
the other hand, reflect the business implication when security is compromised.
It is of course possible to directly connect assets’ security requirements to the
business vision. But then the shift of focus from purely technical level security
concerns to strategical level business concerns seems abrupt. The introduction
of CIFs makes the shift smooth and the line of reasoning easier to follow.
Once the requirements are categorized and prioritized, other techniques, like
attacks trees or misuse cases can be used to explore all possible threats and attack
paths that would lead to the violation of security properties. In this example,
it is to find out how the control system’s availability can be compromised. Our
approach is complementary to this line of work, in the sense that we provide a
business-grounded rationale for why certain security requirements are important
while others are not.
2.5 Discussion
A common way used in practice to get a very high-level specification and pri-
oritization of security requirements is categorizing every IT asset or project on
two dimensions [6]: risk level (low, medium, high), and security concern (con-
fidentiality, integrity, availability). Compared to our approach, this very simple
framework has several disadvantages: the security concerns are fixed, and there is
no explicit representation of the rationale behind placing an asset or project at a
certain level. There is no reference to the business vision whatsoever. Apart from
the advantages and disadvantages of the approaches, it is worthwhile to consider
the context in which these approaches are used in practice. It is our intention to
further study the context of specifying security requirements in practical situa-
tions such as the government organization mentioned, and see to what extend
our approach addresses practical issues.
3 Related Research
There exist a number of security standards, among which COBIT (Control
Objectives for Information and related Technology) [7] and BS7799 [8] are of
particular relevance to our work. COBIT defines control objectives but does
not provide guidelines on how to reach the objectives. BS7799 (later became
ISO17799/27001) is strictly focused on IT security and addresses a company’s
security from a best practice point of view, which does not provide any answer to
why certain security mechanisms are in place for a particular organization. Both
COBIT and ISO17799 however, do not define guidelines on how to prioritize in
a proper way the company assets and their security properties.
Our approach is also related to the work of security requirement modeling
[9–12].This line of work focuses on how to model threat, including the threat
actors and their attack paths. Our approach on the other hand, focuses on pro-
viding business rationale for explaining why certain security requirements exist
in the first place. We also address how to prioritize security requirements, which
is a problem not addressed by the other approaches. We believe it is impor-
tant to prioritize security requirements since not all can be satisfied, because in
reality only limited resources are set aside for improving security in organiza-
tions. Our approach can be combined with the modeling work. First, the security
requirements are ranked using our approach. Next, for the prioritized security
requirements, misuse case or attack trees [13] can be use to model how attacks
that will violate the security requirements could actually happen.
4 Conclusions
The ISO 17999 standard on information security requires an organization to
protect information from a wide range of threats to ensure business continuity,
minimize business damage, and maximize return on investments and business
opportunities. It is clear from this requirement that information security is ul-
timately about business security. In this paper, we have argued the necessity of
making explicit the link between security requirements and the organization’s
business drivers. Furthermore we have proposed a conceptual framework to that
aim. The three main elements of our framework are business vision, CIFs and
valuable assets and their security requirements. The connection between business
goals and security requirements, once established, can be used to provide ratio-
nale for prioritizing security requirements. A number of issues will be addressed
further in the future. An in-depth case study with a dutch government agency
will reveal to what extend our approach addresses practical issues. We need to
define guidelines that help the creative process of coming up with a proper set of
CIFs. Also in the face of contradicting business visions, proper guidelines should
be given on how to combine the results.
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